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Abstract—Badges are commonly used in online platforms as
incentives for promoting contributions. It is widely accepted that
badges “steer” people?s behavior toward increasing their rate
of contributions before obtaining the badge. This paper provides
a new probabilistic model of user behavior in the presence of
badges. By applying the model to data from thousands of users
on the Q&A site Stack Overflow, we find that steering is not
as widely applicable as was previously understood. Rather, the
majority of users remain apathetic toward badges, while still
providing a substantial number of contributions to the site. An
interesting statistical phenomenon, termed “Phantom Steering,”
accounts for the interaction data of these users and this may
have contributed to some previous conclusions about steering.
Our results suggest that a small population, approximately 20%,
of users respond to the badge incentives. Moreover, we conduct a
qualitative survey of the users on Stack Overflow which provides
further evidence that the insights from the model reflect the
true behavior of the community. We argue that while badges
might contribute toward a suite of effective rewards in an online
system, research into other aspects of reward systems such as
Stack Overflow reputation points should become a focus of the
community.
Index Terms—Virtual badges, steering, goal-gradient hypoth-
esis, amortized inference
I. INTRODUCTION
A well known finding from behavioral science research is
that efforts towards a goal increase with proximity to the
goal. This phenomenon, termed the goal-gradient hypothesis,
has been demonstrated in a variety of settings, from ani-
mal studies in the lab to consumer purchasing behavior [1],
[2]. More recently, the goal-gradient effect was observed
in people’s behavior in online communities that use virtual
rewards, such as badges and reputation points, to increase
users’ contributions to the site [3], [4]. Recent examples of
online settings that are using badges include communication
platforms such as MS teams, ride-sharing platforms such as
Lyft and online learning platforms such as Duolingo. We study
this “steering” phenomenon in one such community, that of
Stack Overflow (SO), where users can acquire badges for
making different contributions to the platform, such as editing
and voting on posts. We identify who exhibits steering, who
does not, and how this steering behavior can be characterised
from observational data. Our surprising result is that a large
population (at least 40%) of SO users who are highly active,
do not appear to exhibit steering towards badges.
We present a generative model of steering which models
users as having default activity rates which they can devi-
ate from when approaching the requirements for achieving
a badge. The model is able to fit a complex multimodal
distribution over the parameters that govern users’ activities.
This allows it to capture different levels of steering in the
population. We applied the model to data collected from
thousands of SO users, and investigate the following research
questions: Are all badge achievers affected by the steering
(or goal-gradient) hypothesis in the same way? If some users
do not steer, what portion of the population falls under this
category? Does the presence of these users in the data set
change any conclusions that were previously drawn about the
phenomenon of steering?
Our results revealed the following insights: First, more
than 40% of the users are not steered, in that they exhibit a
consistent activity rate in SO that is not effected by the badge.
We prove that a “bump” in activity conveyed by prior work
arises as an artifact of centering the data on the day of badge
achievement [4], [5]. We call this phenomenon the Phantom
Steering Effect. Second, about 20% of users are steered, in
that they dramatically increase their rate of activity prior to
achieving the badge. It is the effect that this small population
of steered users has on aggregate measures that has led to
the previous and broader claims of steering [3]–[5]. Third,
the majority of these steered users decrease their activity rate
beyond what is claimed in prior work [4], reaching close to 0
after the badge has been achieved. Lastly, our conclusions are
supported by responses to a user study that included 70 active
SO participants, in which only 24% of participants selected
badges as a motivating factor for their contribution.
Our study has important ramifications for system designers
who invest resources into the implementation of badge rewards
systems and for researchers who wish to understand the factors
that contribute towards users’ continued participation in online
communities.
II. RELATED WORK
We begin by relating to the general literature on the effect of
badges in online communities. We then present in detail the
specific work of [4] which helps to motivate the generative
models that we develop in Section III.
A. The Study of Online Badges
The goal-gradient hypothesis stems from behavioral re-
search where animals were observed to increase their effort as
they approach a reward [1], [2]. Kivetz et al., [2] studied the
behavior of different populations of people who were working
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toward various rewards. They concluded that the goal-gradient
hypothesis also holds true for people. Subjects who received a
loyalty card, which tracked the number of coffees purchased
from a local coffee chain, purchased coffee significantly more
frequently the closer they were to earning a free cup of coffee.
The authors recognized the existence of a group of participants
who did not complete their coffee cards for the duration of the
study, and did not exhibit a noticeable change in their coffee
purchasing habits. They concluded that the loyalty card effect
was constrained to the population of participants who handed
in their completed loyalty cards in exchange for the free-coffee
reward.
Anderson et al., [4] and Mutter and Kundisch [3] were the
first to study the goal-gradient hypothesis in online settings.
They studied the observed effect of badges on the behavior of
participants in large Q&A sites. Both studies found evidence
that users increase their rate of work as they approach the
badge threshold. However, they did not address the possibility
that some users might achieve the badge as a consequence
of their routine interactions on the website rather than being
steered by the badge. There is a possibility that people’s
actions are governed by motivations other than badges. We
extend these works by allowing for this possibility, such
that we can characterize the true changes to users’ behavior
under the influence of a badge, and distinguish this from the
case where users do not noticeably change their interaction
behavior.
Other studies have independently confirmed that the pres-
ence of online badges increases the probability that a user
will act in a manner to achieve the badge, as well as the
rate at which the user will perform those actions [5]–[8].
Kusmierczyk and Gomez-Rodriguez [6] highlight the impor-
tance of modeling the “utility heterogeneity” among the users
but they study badges which have a threshold of 1 and do
not characterize how one might change one’s behavior in the
presence of the badge incentive. Yanovsky et al., [5] study
the presence of different populations within the SO database
by employing a clustering routine. They discovered notably
different responses to the badge based on the cluster that a user
belongs to. Their study did not acknowledge the possibility
that the observed data might be consistent with a hypothesis
that some users do not exhibit steering. Anderson et al., [9]
studied the implementation of a badge system in a massive
open online course and they provide a prescriptive system
for the design of badges such that there is a maximum effect
on the population. Zhang et al., [10] suggest that SO create
new badges to encourage users to integrate helpful comments
into the accepted answers. They thereby present an example
of how system designers might use a badge to encourage a
desired behavior from their user base. In contrast to this, we
suggest that badges have a limited scope and work should be
completed to understand other motivations that the users’ have
such that better and more effective rewards can be designed
to motivate online communities.
B. A Utility Model for Steering
Most relevant to our work is the paper of [4] who present
a parametric description of a user’s utility when the user is
steered by badges. The model describes a user as having a
preferred distribution from which actions are sampled. As
users approach the required threshold for achieving a badge,
they deviate from their preferred distributions. The deviation
from the preferred distribution is controlled by the utility
gained by achieving the badge and the cost for deviating from
the preferred distribution.
We let Adu refer to the distribution over the count of actions
that a user u takes on day d. The user’s utility is a function of
Adu and it is the sum of three terms.
1 The first term, ∑b∈B IbVb,
is the non-negative value that a user derives from already-
attained badge rewards (where Vb is the assumed value of
a badge and Ib is the indicator that the user has attained
badge b). The second term, θEAdu [Uu,d+1(A
d+1
u )], describes the
user’s expected future utility, discounted by θ , when acting
under the distribution Adu . The final term, g(A
d
u ,P
d
u ), is a
cost function that penalises the user for deviating from the
preferred distribution Pdu on that day. The cost g represents
the unwillingness of the users to change their behavior, and it
is in tension with the users’ desire to achieve future badges.
The utility on day d for user u is then [4]:
Uu,d(Adu) = ∑
b∈B
IbV bu +θEAdu [Uu,d+1(A
d+1
u )]−g(Adu ,Pdu )
It is important to note that the cost term g is non-zero
only when users deviate from their preferred distribution Pdu .
As such, this model assumes users deviate only to attain the
value from the badge and only if that value outweighs the cost
that is paid for deviating. This means that a deviation on the
rate of actions which are incentivized by the badge must be
an increase before the badge is achieved and cannot be an
increase after the badge is achieved. We will make these same
assumptions in the models presented in Section III-A.
This utility-based model presents a compelling description
of how people respond to badges; however, it was not eval-
uated or tested by fitting it to specific data from SO. Rather,
predictions of the model were compared to aggregated data
from SO and we show in Section VI that the aggregated anal-
ysis from these count data can lead to incorrect conclusions.
The lack of analysis on individual level predictions limits the
credibility of the study as well as its practical value — it is
difficult to apply the utility-based model to the placement of
badges without a means of determining the appropriate model
parameters for a given community of contributors.
In this work we address the shortcomings of the utility-
based approach by introducing a probabilistic model which
allows us to use the vast literature on posterior inference in
1Our notation differs slightly from that of [4]. Anderson et al., [4] uses a
parameter xa to refer to a user’s distribution over the next action. We rather
use Adu to denote the distribution over the count of actions on a particular day.
The two are linked (the distribution over the next action influences the count
of actions on a specific day), however, we choose to model directly the data
that is available from SO rather than a quantity that we do not observe.
such models to assist with parameter estimation [11]–[15].
The probabilistic model has two advantages over this prior
work: (1) posterior distributions for latent parameters in the
model can be learnt from real-world interaction data and (2)
the model’s fit to data can be used to test and update scientific
hypotheses (for example, in this paper we propose and validate
that while some users may steer in a similar way, there exist
users who do not experience steering).
III. MODELING USER ACTIVITIES
We model users’ activities in SO as a distribution over their
action counts. The model aims to incorporate the major aspects
of the utility model from [4] but it frames the problem such
that parameters can be estimated from data and the models
can be tested on their fit to unseen user action data to allow
for model comparison [11], [16]. Moreover, the model allows
for different users to experience different levels of steering.
A. A Generative Model of Steering
Let Pu be a latent parameter that controls the rate of activity
for user u; this is the preferred distribution of user u. Pu
induces a probability distribution over the action counts Au
of user u. Let β denote the deviation of the user’s activity
from Pu as a result of steering. The observed data for each
user, Au, consists of daily action counts for a predetermined
number of weeks before and after achieving the badge. Thus,
for D days of interaction, Pu, Au and β are all vectors of length
D.
Fig. 1 presents three plausible models of user behavior in
SO. White circles denote latent random variables and colored
circles denote observed random variables; solid lines repre-
sent conditional dependence between the random variables.
Model 0 (left) describes a non-steering scenario, in which
the observed action counts, Au, depend only on the user’s
preferred distribution, Pu. Model 1 (center) is a steering model
in which a user deviates systematically from Pu in a manner
that is controlled by β . As the values for β increase (above
0), the users experience an increased activity rate (above their
preferred distribution). Similarly, as β decreases (below 0), the
users experience a decreased activity rate. Model 1 assumes
that all users are steered in the same way. Model 2 (right)
relaxes this assumption by introducing a user-specific strength
parameter Su ∈ (0,1) which mediates the effect of β for user
u. As Su decreases, the users deviate less from their base
distributions. When Su approaches zero, the users’ activity
converges to that described by Model 0.
The parameter β , that controls how a user responds to the
badge, is a vector of length D (each day relative to the date
of badge achievement). To reflect the intuition developed by
[4] and explained in Section II-B, we constrain β to be non-
negative before day 0 — the day when the user achieves the
badge. Moreover, we constrain β to be non-positive after this
day to reflect the intuition that a user gains no further utility
from the badge once it has been achieved (and thus does not
work harder than his preferred distribution Pu). β therefore
Fig. 1. Model 0 (baseline model) has no notion of a badge – only a
user’s preferred distribution induces the distribution over the observed actions.
Model 1 allows for a global badge deviation (β ) from a user’s preferred
distribution and it is experienced by all users. Model 2 has a user-specific
strength parameter (Su) that mediates the adherence to β .
implicitly includes the trade-off between the cost function g
and the badge utility V that is discussed in Section II-B.
B. Likelihood of Action Counts
In this section we define the parameters that govern the
distribution over users’ action counts in SO. We wish to
describe a variety of behaviors, including users who contribute
sporadically and those who are more consistent. We therefore
model action counts using a zero-inflated Poisson distribution.
The zero-inflated Poisson distribution has a rate parameter λ du
and a Bernoulli probability αdu associated with each user u
and each day d of interaction. The Bernoulli parameter αdu
describes the probability that user u is active or not on a
given day d. The rate parameter λ du describes the expected
count of actions that the user will perform under a Poisson
distribution, conditioned on the user being active. Note that
a user can be active on the platform without performing an
action (e.g., logs on to the SO website but does not contribute).
Conceptually, this would correspond to drawing a 1 from the
Bernoulli distribution but a count of 0 actions from the Poisson
distribution.
The probability that user u performs k actions on day d is
presented in (1). We refer to the parameters αdu and λ du as a
user’s rate parameters for day d.
Pr[Adu = k] =
{
(1−αdu )+αdu Poisson(0 | λ du ), if k = 0
αdu Poisson(k | λ du ), otherwise
(1)
C. Deriving the Rate Parameters αu and λu
This section connects the rate parameters αu and λu to the
generative models of Section III-A. Each of Pu, β and Su
includes one component for αu and one component for λu.
As such, for D days of interaction, Pu = (Pu,1,Pu,2) comprises
two real-valued vectors, each of length D. Pu,1 is the user’s
preferred distribution that is associated with αu and Pu,2 is
the user’s preferred distribution associated with the parameter
λu. Similarly, β = (β1,β2) comprises two real-valued vectors
of length D that are associated with αu and λu respectively.
Finally, Su = (Su,1,Su,2), is a tuple of two numbers between 0
and 1 which mediate (multiply) β1 and β2 for user u.
Equation (2) derives a vector of probability values αu (one
for each day of interaction) as the element-wise sigmoid
transformation of a vector that is the addition of the user’s
preferred distribution Pu,1 with β1 where β1 is mediated by
(multiplied by) Su,1. Equation (2) also derives a vector of
strictly positive rate values λu (one for each day of interaction)
as the element-wise softplus transformation of the vector
Pu,2+Su,2×β2.
αu = σ (Pu,1+Su,1×β1)
λu = so f t plus(Pu,2+Su,2×β2)
(2)
The complete generative description for Model 2 is as follows
(Models 1 and 0 are generated in the same way, with parameter
Su set to 1 and 0 respectively):
1) Sample Pu and Su from their prior distributions (see
Section III-D).
2) Compute αu and λu using (2).
3) Sample the vector of the counts of actions for user u
from the zero-inflated Poisson as in (1).
D. Generating the Latent Parameters Pu and Su
The distributions over Pu and Su can be complex and
multi-modal (reflecting the intuition that people display vary-
ing activity patterns). Following [12], we represent these
distributions with a simple distribution (an m-dimensional
isotropic Gaussian) which we transform via a series of bi-
jective mappings to form a complex and possibly multi-modal
distribution [12], [17]. The use of such transformations, called
normalizing flows, has been shown to improve the modeling
of complex distributions [17].
The output of the normalizing flows corresponds to a sample
in latent space from the generating distribution for a user’s
preferred distribution. We transform the output through a
feed-forward network to a real-valued vector which is Pu. In
this work we constrain Pu such that it can learn a different
distribution for each day of the week. This enforces that Pu
does not evolve with a certain trend but it does allow different
days to have different expected activity rates (e.g., some users
might work more during the week than on the weekend).
The distribution over the steering parameters, Su, for Model
2 are assigned to be two elements in the m-dimensional vector
after the transformations from the normalizing flows. In this
way, the latent dimensionality for all three models in Fig. 1 is
kept constant. These real values are transformed via a sigmoid
function to create Su,1,Su,2 ∈ (0,1).
IV. AMORTIZED VARIATIONAL INFERENCE FOR STEERING
To infer the underlying parameters in the latent space,
we use amortized inference [13], [15]. Amortized inference
uses a neural network to encode a data point into the latent
parameters that are associated with its approximate posterior
distribution. Moreover, the inference objective allows model
comparison such that hypotheses about the data can be tested
(e.g., allowing us to validate the inclusion of the steering
parameter Su).
A fully-specified generative model defines a joint distribu-
tion over some latent random variables (z) and the observed
random variables (x). The challenge is to infer the posterior
of the latent parameters given the data that was actually
observed p(z | x). For all but a handful of conjugate models,
the posterior is intractable to derive analytically [18]–[20].
Variational inference is a popular method for approximating
the intractable posterior distribution by introducing a different
(and more easily sampled from and evaluated) distribution
over the same latent variables, q(z). By minimizing the KL-
divergence between q(z) and the true posterior p(z | x), one
obtains an approximation to the true posterior [20].
It is important to note that minimizing the KL-divergence
between q(z) and p(z | x) is equivalent to maximizing the
variational objective, called the Evidence Lower BOund (see
[20] for a derivation and discussion). This ELBO derives its
namesake from the fact that it lower-bounds the marginal log-
likelihood of the data under the assumptions of the model,
a fact easily derived in the next equation, where Jensen’s
inequality is applied in the final line. It is due to this lower
bound on the marginal log-likelihood, that it is also common
to use the ELBO for model comparison (as is done in
Section V-A).
log p(x) = log
∫
p(x,z)dz
= log
∫
p(x,z)
q(z)
q(z)
dz
= logEq(z)
[
p(x,z)
q(z)
]
≥ Eq(z)
[
log
p(x,z)
q(z)
]
:= ELBO(x)
V. EMPIRICAL STUDY
SO has supplied us with the anonymized interaction data of
users on the site from January 2017 to April 2019. The data
consist of a count of actions per user per day. We focus our
analysis on the 6,916 users who achieved the Electorate badge,
which is awarded to users who vote on 600 questions, with at
least 25% of their total votes cast on questions.2 This is the
same badge type that was studied by [4]. The observed data is
the number of actions (question votes) per user per day for 5
weeks before and after achieving the badge, making 70 days of
interaction per person. Voting is a particularly important action
to study as there are no reputation points that are awarded for
voting on SO. Therefore, while we can obtain similar results
on other badge types with data that are freely available,3 we
focus on the voting badge here to reduce the possibility of
the presence of the reputation points system confounding our
analysis.
2The users’ voting data is not publicly available but qualitatively similar
results can be obtained on other badge types in the freely available repository
of data found at https://archive.org/details/stackexchange.
3The modeling and inference code, details of network structure, and the
application to the freely available “editing” data can be found at the repository:
https://github.com/NickHoernle/icdm 2020. Moreover, see Appendix B for a
reproducible analysis on freely available data.
We compare the performance of Model 2, Model 1, and
Model 0 as described in Section III-A. We also include a
naı¨ve baseline that uses maximum likelihood assignments for
the rate parameters by setting αu to equal the fraction of
users who were active on day u, and λu to equal the mean
of the active users’ action counts for day u. For all models,
we report two measures of performance: the evidence lower
bound (the ELBO), which is the lower-bound on the marginal
log-likelihood of the data under the model assumptions [12],
[13], [20]; and the mean square error (MSE) of the model for
reconstructing the original number of actions for each user.
Parameter estimation is done in Pytorch and Adam is used to
maximize the ELBO with a learning rate of 0.001. We set the
dimensionality of the latent space to m := 20 and use planar
normalizing flows with 12 layers [12].
A. Model Comparison
We trained the models using the data of 4,149 users
(validation set of 1,386 users,) while results are reported
on a hold-out test set of 1,381 users. Table I compares the
performance of the models on this test set. The results from
Table I show that Model 2 outperforms the other models
achieving a higher bound on the marginal log-likelihood and
a lower reconstruction error on unseen data. Moreover, the
benefit of the amortized approach (which learns a complex
representation of Pu for each user) is demonstrated in that
Models 0, 1 and 2 all had a higher ELBO and consequently a
lower reconstruction error than the naı¨ve baseline. Both Model
1 and 2 outperform Model 0, suggesting that the inclusion of
the steering parameter β does increase the probability of the
data.
Fig. 2 (left) presents a scatter plot of the magnitude of the
inferred Su,1 and Su,2 parameters. Each point in the scatter
plot corresponds to a user. The scatter plot shows two clear
modes. One mode is in the top right corner of the plot which
corresponds to users with (Su,1,Su,2)≈ (1,1). We refer to the
roughly 20% of users in this mode as the “strong-steerers”
because they adhere strictly to the β deviation. The second,
and larger, mode is in the bottom left of the plot which
corresponds to (Su,1,Su,2) ≈ (0,0). We refer to the roughly
40% of users in this mode as the “non-steerers” as they appear
to eschew the β deviation.
We show 5 samples from the strong-steered population on
the top-right hand corner of Fig. 2. The plots show the true
count of actions as a function of time alongside the expected
number of actions under the assumptions of Model 2. The
TABLE I
ELBO (LOWER BOUND TO LOG-LIKELIHOOD) AND MEAN SQUARED
ERROR RECONSTRUCTION (MSE).
Model ELBO MSE
Model 2 (w/ Su) −79.3 0.126
Model 1 (w/o Su) −104.9 0.174
Model 0 (Baseline) −116.1 0.179
Naı¨ve Baseline −460.7 49.33
red vertical line, on day 0, corresponds to the day that the
user achieved the Electorate badge. It is important to note the
high number of actions (both expected and true) before day 0
when the badge was achieved. After day 0, both the true and
expected numbers of actions drops dramatically.
In contrast to these strong-steered users, the bottom right
of Fig. 2 presents 5 samples from the non-steered population.
The counts of actions appear to show no change around day 0.
These users appear not to change their behavior in the presence
of the badge.
B. Analysis of Steering
The form of the inferred parameter β shows the effect of
steering on users over time. The plot of β as a function of
time is presented in Fig. 3. The magnitude of the values of
β indicate direct changes to the probability that the user is
active, as well as expected changes in the number of actions
on a given day. In accordance with related work, users increase
their rate of activity as they approach the day upon which they
achieved the badge [3], [4], [7]. At its peak, β2 suggests that
the strong-steerers will increase the number of actions (over
their preferred distribution) by approximately 15 question-
votes.
A novel insight of our model is that β decreases below 0
after the badge has been achieved. That is, users may decrease
their activity beyond their preferred distribution after they have
achieved the badge. This result suggests that for those users
who are steered strongly, they may stop contributing altogether
once the badge has been achieved.
Fig. 4 presents the mean number of interactions per user
as a function of the number of days until/after the badge is
achieved. The three lines correspond to the three groups from
Fig. 2: non-steerers, strong-steerer and the other users who
are in neither of the two modes. We choose a deliberately
low and generous cutoff (Su,1,Su,2)> (.3, .3) to define a user
as a member of the strong-steerer group and choose very
conservative values (Su,1,Su,2) < (.2, .1) to be considered as
non-steerers. Thus it is possible that the true number of non-
steerer users in the dataset might then be higher than the
quoted 41.8% in this analysis. The strong-steerers make up
20.9% of users and experience steering as is described by
previous work — they increase their rate of work dramatically
before the badge is achieved. Notice that the mean interaction
count from these users’ drops passed the other groups to close
to 0 after they achieve the badge.
The non-steered population (41.8%) show no change in their
interaction rates before or after the receipt of the badge. There
is a distinct uptick in the mean number of question-vote actions
on the day before and on the day of the badge achievement
(Fig. 4, orange line). It is possible that this “bump” might
mistakenly be seen as the response of the users to the badge
incentive. In fact, this bump is an artifact of the analysis
technique which centers trajectories around a threshold that
is crossed by the cumulative sum of the trajectory entries (see
Section VI and Appendix A for a discussion and proof of this
claim).
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magnitude of their steering strength parameters (Su)
Table II presents the sizes of these three groups (when
considering the entire data set). We highlight the fact that
the non-steerer population is twice as large as the strong-
steerer population and while the strong-steerer population is
the minority, it is the highly engaged interaction activity from
these users that may have led to some previous conclusions
about steering.
TABLE II
NUMBER OF USERS WHERE THE LATENT PARAMETER S IS USED TO
THRESHOLD THE AMOUNT OF STEERING.
Group (S1;S2) # Users
Non-steerer (S1,S2)< (0.2,0.1) 2890(41.79%)
Other Other 2579(37.29%)
Strong-steerer (S1,S2)> (0.3,0.3) 1447(20.92%)
VI. PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF PHANTOM STEERING
The population of non-steerers in Fig. 4 displays a sharp
uptick in the mean of their action counts on the day before
and on the day of the badge achievement. We prove that such
a bump arises as an artifact of centering the data on day
0, and it is therefore expected to arise even in the absence
of a steering effect. We show this “phantom steering” bump
occurs in the setting of Model 0 (Fig. 1) where daily action
counts are independent draws from some unchanging latent
distribution. Our proof (and the intuition arising from it)
suggests that a similar bump arises in the presence of steering
as well. It is possible that this bump may have served to inflate
previous conclusions about how users change their behavior
when working to achieve badges [3]–[5].
For users acting under Model 0 we present Theorem VI.1,
which implies that for sufficiently large badge thresholds the
expected number of actions on day 0 (the day of badge
achievement) is greater than the expected number of actions
on any other day.
We introduce this theorem via the following intuitive exam-
ple: Suppose that the badge threshold N is chosen randomly
from some large range N ∈ [m,M] of possible action counts.
Let Sn be the cumulative number of actions from a user up to
(and including) day n. As long as the user continues to act on
the platform, Sn will eventually traverse the interval [m,M].
Moreover, as the count of actions on any day n is a random
variable (drawn from the user’s preferred distribution), Sn is
more likely to cross the threshold N on a day on which the user
makes relatively more contributions. This claim holds even
when actions are drawn under the no-steering assumptions
of Model 0 which assumes that users’ action counts on each
day are independent draws from their preferred distribution Pu
(which is not influenced by steering).
We formalize this intuition in Theorem VI.1, the proof of
which appears in Appendix A. Recall that the random variable
A0u describes the number of actions that user u performs on the
day that they receive the badge. Denote the number of actions
required to achieve the badge by N, and let A0u,N denote this
random variable when the badge threshold is N actions and
user u acts according to Model 0.
Theorem VI.1. If Pu is bounded then:
lim
N→∞
E[A0u,N ] = E[Pu]+
Var[Pu]
E[Pu]
.
This expected bump size holds in the limit as the badge
threshold becomes large with respect to the mean of Pu. For
fixed Pu the convergence to this limit is exponential in the
threshold.
Theorem VI.1 applies when a user’s distribution is identical
for all days and their actions are drawn independently from
it. In order to distinguish between days of the week as in
Section III-D, we now generalize this theorem to the setting
where each user has a distinct distribution for each day of the
week and they draw from these distributions independently
in turn. Let τ ∈ {1, . . . ,7} index days of the week. Because
the Pdu are indexed by day where d = 0 is the day of
badge achievement, the sequence P1u , . . . ,P
τ
u , . . . ,P
7
u ,P
1
u , . . . is
the vector of a user’s preferred distribution for the entire period
under study.4 We generalize Theorem VI.1 to the following
result, the proof of which is also relegated to Appendix A:
Theorem VI.2. If each of the distributions P1u . . . ,Pτu , . . . ,PTu
is finite and nonzero (and nonnegative and integer valued),
then
lim
N→∞
E[A0u,N ] =
∑Tτ=1E[(Pτu )2]
∑Tτ=1E[Pτu ]
.
VII. USER SURVEY
As an additional form of validation for the analytical results
that are presented in this paper, we hosted a survey that
recruited participants from SO to answer questions relating to
their motivations for contributing to the website. A clickable
advertisement was placed on SO and willing participants were
4Note that days are indexed arbitrarily for different users indicating that
they may start their interaction, and achieve the badge, on any random day.
directed to the survey. We paid each survey participant $10 for
completing the survey. In total, we received 70 responses from
the community.
Fig. 5 summarizes the responses to the question: “What
are your reasons for participating in SO?” The majority of
users claimed to have personal and/or altruistic reasons for
contribution to the website with 87.1% claiming to contribute
to increase their own knowledge (and 68.6% claiming to want
to “contribute to the community”). In contrast to this, only
24.2% of the users selected the reason to “achieve badges”.
50% of users claimed that they had a goal of increasing their
reputation score.
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Fig. 5. Counts of responses to the reasons for contributing to Stack Overflow.
We also asked the users specifically about their voting
contributions: “What motivates you to vote on other people’s
posts?” The responses to this question are summarised in
Fig. 6. Participants could select any combination of three
different reasons for voting: badge acquisition (“I wished
to achieve one of the voting badges: e.g., Supporter, Critic,
Suffrage, Vox Populi, Civic Duty or Electorate”); altruism (“I
think it is important to provide feedback about other’s work”),
or “other”. Only 12.9% of participants who engage in voting
actions reported badge acquisition is a motivating factor for
their work. (Eight of the participants in the study claimed to
not engage in voting actions and were not counted.)
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Fig. 6. Counts of responses to the reasons for voting in Stack Overflow.
Together these results present further evidence to corrob-
orate the model predictions that only a minority of the SO
participants are indeed steered by badges.
VIII. LIMITATIONS
The empirical study in Section V has a number of limita-
tions which we list here. However, we note that most of these
limitations can be addressed in future work which is discussed
in Section IX.
First, our empirical analysis was limited to 6,916 SO users
who achieved the Electorate badge from January 2017 to April
2019. The Electorate badge is the highest badge category for
vote actions and while the number of users who achieve this
badge is a small fraction of all users who vote on the platform
(0.18%), these users account for 38.4% of all votes that have
been performed on SO. In Appendix B we have included a
qualitatively similar study on the larger population of 25,314
users who achieved the Civic Duty badge. The users who
achieve this badge represent 0.64% of all users who vote
on SO and they account for 32.8% of all votes cast. The
last group (99.2% of all users who vote) accounts for only
28.8% of all votes cast and have achieved neither the Civic
Duty nor the Electorate badge. We also motivate that studying
the voting actions helps to provide insight into badge effect
on user behaviour as voting actions do not receive reputation
points on SO and therefore they do not have this as a possible
confounding variable (as would be present for the editing
badges). See Appendix B for an extended analysis from the
freely available editing data.
A second limitation that is related to the first is our focus
on only one action type, that of voting-actions. We chose to
do this in order to study the effect of the badge on the action
that it directly incentivizes, which is presumably associated
with the largest response to the badge (β in our model). This
is a limitation as previous work has raised the possibility
that a badge of one type (e.g., incentivizing voting actions)
can have effects on actions of another type (e.g., editing or
reviewing actions) [3], [4]. We note this is a limitation of our
empirical study and not a limitation of the models that have
been presented as the models can extend easily to this new
setting where many actions are included in a new likelihood
model.
A third limitation is that we explicitly assume a single
parametric form for the steering parameter β . This assumption
is that all steered users deviate from their preferred distribution
in the same way, and that users only differ in the strength
parameter S. However, it is clear that a significant portion
of the population (±40%) are neither steered nor non-steered
(they are not in the two modes that are described in Fig. 2)
leading to the conclusion that this simplifying assumption is
inadequate to capture the population of users at large.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a novel probabilistic model that describes
how users interact on the SO platform and in particular how
these users respond to badge incentives on the website. We
demonstrated how this model can be fit to the data that is
provided by SO and we investigated the distribution that is
learnt over the latent space that describes the “steering effect”.
Our results provide a more informed understanding of how
users respond to badges in online communities. First, that
some users do exhibit steering supports the claims made by
previous work [3]–[5], [21]. However, approximately 40% of
the population do not exhibit steering. These users do not
change the rate of their activity for the 10 weeks under study.
Rather, they continue to act with the same rate well after the
badge has been achieved. This suggests that these users have
reasons for performing voting actions on SO which do not
include the desire to obtain the Electorate badge.
Second, the 20% of the population identified as strong-
steerers significantly decrease their level of contributions after
day zero, beyond what was previously reported. It is possible
that assigning additional badges, with thresholds beyond those
already in place in SO will continue to motivate such users.
Third, any analysis of badge behavior must take into ac-
count the presence of the phantom steering bump which has
not previously been acknowledged in the context of badges.
This statistical artifact is model independent and may lead
to inflated conclusions about the effect of badges on users’
behavior.
Future work will extend the models of Section III to allow
for different responses β to a badge. We will update the model
to include multiple β parameters to capture different responses
to badges across users. It is possible that the roughly 40% of
users who are not well described by Model 2 have responses
that are not described by a single β parameter and allowing for
this more intricate model will allow it to capture more users
into some behavioral archetype. Moreover, we wish to study
the indirect effect of badges of a certain type on actions that
are not directly incentivized by this badge, as stated by [4]
and [21]. Our model can be directly applied to studying this
question by modeling the likelihood of activities as a vector
for each action type.
A deeper understanding of how and why users contribute to
these peer-production websites will inform the design of more
personalized and effective rewards that motivate and engage
the users. Our user study has highlighted that reputation points
and altruistic factors such as “impact” may contribute more
than badges towards motivating users on SO. We therefore
propose to design models that assist in understanding how
these different rewards can be leveraged to incentivize users
on such platforms.
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APPENDIX
A. Omitted Proofs
Here we present the proof of Theorem VI.1. Let X be
a nonnegative, bounded, and integer-valued random variable.
Let {Xm}m∈N be independent random variables which are
distributed identically to X . We will be concerned with the
partial sums Sn =∑nm=1 Xm. Let YN denote the random variable
which is the copy Xm that brings Sn across the threshold N;
that is, for which Sm−1 < N and Sm ≥ N.
Theorem A.1. If X is nonnegative, integer-valued, and
bounded then
lim
N→∞
E[YN ] = E[X ]+
Var[X ]
E[X ]
More generally, we also consider the case when the X
are drawn from distributions X1, . . . ,Xτ , . . . ,XT repeatedly in
turn. Then the partial sums are Sn = ∑nm=1 Xm mod T , where all
copies of Xτ are independent. Let ξτ denote the event that YN
is drawn from distribution Xτ , and let Z = ∑Dτ=1 Xτ . For this
setting we have the following theorem:
Theorem A.2. If each of the distributions Xτ is finite, nonzero,
nonnegative, and integer valued then
lim
N→∞
E[YN ] =
∑τ E[(Xτ)2]
E[Z]
.
Theorem A.1 follows directly from Theorem A.2 by taking
the Xτ to be identically distributed. It therefore suffices to
prove Theorem A.2.
We begin by showing that the likelihood of the sequence
{Sn} visiting any given number N is asymptotically uniform.
Let pm := E [|{n ∈ N : Sn = m}|], g := gcd(range(X)) and ob-
serve that if X > 0 then pm = Pr[m ∈ {Sn}]. Also, if m 6∈ gN
then clearly pm = 0. For the pm for which m ∈ gN, we have
the following lemma:
Lemma A.3. If X is nonzero, nonnegative, and bounded then
lim
n→∞ pgn =
g
µ
Proof. First, it suffices to assume that g = 1. This is because
the integer-valued random variable X ′ := X/g has mean µ/g
and gcd(range(X ′)) = 1, and proving the claim for X ′ implies
the claim for X . It also suffices to assume that X > 0. This
is because the sequence {Sn}n∈N remains at a specific value
m only so long as the independent draws are Xn = 0, after
which it leaves m forever. The expected number of steps that
{Sn} lingers at m for is exactly 11−α , where α = Pr[X = 0].
Since µ > 0 by assumption, we may prove the claim for X ′′ :=
X |X > 0. Then µ = µ ′′1−α and
pm = E [|{n ∈ N : Sn = m}|] = 11−α p
′′
m
Thus proving the claim for X ′′, proves the claim for X .
Therefore, we may assume without loss of generality that
X > 0 and that gcd(range(X)) = 1.
Let M := max{range(X)} be the maximum value that X
obtains. Then the pm obey the recurrence
pm =
M
∑
j=1
pm− j Pr[X = j] (3)
with the initial conditions p0 = 1 and pm = 0 for all m < 0.
Because X is bounded by M, we may break N up into “epochs”
{1, . . . ,M},{M+1, . . . ,2M}, . . ., and then define qkr := pkM+r
with q0 := (0, . . . ,0,1)T . For any m = kM + r we can then
iteratively expand the pm− j terms in Equation 3 for which
m− j ≥ kM until the expression for each pm depends only on
the previous epoch, which gives an alternative recurrence of
the form
pkM+r =
M
∑
s=1
αrs p(k−1)M+s (4)
where r,s ∈ [M] (and the initial conditions are the values of
ps for s ∈ [M]). Note that these αrs do not depend on k. The
recurrences in Equations 3 and 4 give pm as a convex combi-
nation of previous values, and so we may rewrite Equation 4 as
qk = Akq0, where A := {αrs}r,s∈[M] is a right stochastic square
matrix. Furthermore it follows from the assumption g = 1
that A is primitive. Therefore the Perron-Frobenius Theorem
implies that Ak converges exponentially quickly to a matrix
of the form ~1~uT , where ~1 and ~uT are the unique right and
left eigenvectors of A corresponding to the eigenvalue λ = 1.
This in turn implies that qk = Akq0 converges to some uniform
vector (γ, . . . ,γ), and therefore that limm→∞ pm = γ .
Finally we argue that γ = 1/µ . We can show this by
considering C(N,J) := E [|{Sn}∩ [N,J)|], the mean number
of times that {Sn} intersects some interval [N,J). Since the
pm converge, for fixed J we may use linearity of expectation
to choose N large enough to guarantee that C(N,J) ∈ Jγ ± ε
for any given ε > 0. On the other hand, by considering the
{Sn} as “restarting” when they reach the epoch preceding
N, we may use the central limit theorem to argue that
C(N,J) ∈ Jµ ±O(J2/3). Taking the limit as J becomes large
yields γ = 1/µ . 
Proof of Theorem A.2. First, we may assume without loss
of generality that the gcd of the supports of X1 . . .XT is
g = 1. To see this, define new integer random variables
Xˆ1 = X1/g, . . . , XˆT = XT/g. If the claim holds for Xˆ1, . . . , XˆT
then since YgN = gYˆN it follows that:
lim
N→∞
E[YN ] = g lim
N′→∞
E[YˆN′ ] =
∑τ E[g2(Xˆτ)2]
E[gZˆ]
=
∑τ E[(Xτ)2]
E[Z]
For a fixed threshold N, we are interested in the event that
both YN is a copy of Xτ and that YN = k. Then
Pr[ξτ ∧ YN = k]
= Pr
[
∞∨
n=1
(ξτ ∧ Xn = k ∧ Sn−1 ∈ [N− k,N))
]
= Pr
[
∞∨
n=1
(Xτ = k ∧ SnD+τ−1 ∈ [N− k,N))
]
=
∞
∑
n=1
Pr [Xτ = k ∧ SnD+τ−1 ∈ [N− k,N)] .
= Pr[Xτ = k]
∞
∑
n=1
Pr [SnD+τ−1 ∈ [N− k,N)]
= Pr[Xτ = k]E [|{n ∈ N : SnD+τ−1 ∈ [N− k,N)}|]
= Pr[Xτ = k]
N−1
∑
m=N−k
E [|{n ∈ N : SnD+τ−1 = m}|]
It follows that
lim
N→∞
Pr[ξτ ∧ YN = k]
= Pr[Xτ = k] lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
m=N−k
Pr [m ∈ {SnD+τ−1}]
= Pr[Xτ = k]
k
E[Z]
,
where the last equality holds by passing the limit through the
sum and applying Lemma A.3 to Z in order to conclude that
each of the probabilities on the right hand side approaches
1/E[Z]. Therefore,
lim
N→∞
Pr[YN = k] =∑
τ
lim
N→∞
Pr[ξτ ∧ YN = k]
=
k
E[Z]∑τ
Pr[Xτ = k]
We conclude that
lim
N→∞
E[YN ] =
1
E[Z]∑τ ∑k
k2 Pr[Xτ = k] =
∑τ E[(Xτ)2]
E[Z]
.

B. Plots for Strunk & White and Civic Duty Achievers
The following plots show the β deviation for the Civic
Duty (25,314 users) and the Strunk & White (22,496 users)
populations and the mean plots of actions for the groups
inferred from the Su parameter. Code available at: https:
//github.com/NickHoernle/icdm 2020.
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Fig. 7. Expected deviation from a user’s preferred distribution Pu
-35 -28 -21 -14 -7 0 7 14 21 28 35
Days before/after achieving badge
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
M
ea
n 
# 
ac
tio
ns
 p
er
 d
ay
Strong-Steerers (Top Right)
Other
Non-Steerers (Bottom Left)
(a) Civic Duty
-35 -28 -21 -14 -7 0 7 14 21 28 35
Days before/after achieving badge
0
2
4
6
8
10
M
ea
n 
# 
ac
tio
ns
 p
er
 d
ay
Strong-Steerers (Top Right)
Other
Non-Steerers (Bottom Left)
(b) Strunk&White
Fig. 8. Mean number of actions per day for users who are grouped by the
magnitude of their steering strength parameters (S).
